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Abstract
The current level and future evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages are tightly linked to
domestic politics in Latin American countries. Where the structure of a nation's political
institutions offer credible checks and balances against discretionary policymaking, external
linkages including those with Pacific partners are stronger. Future liberalization including the
formation of an FTAA is more likely when new policymakers arrive in office or when existing
policymakers feel strong internal or external pressure to shift the course of their trade policy. A
given liberalization is more likely to be sustained when coupled with short-term observable
improvement in social and economic indicators. Countries with political institutions that fail to
limit policymakers' discretion are particularly sensitive to a failure to demonstrate clear and
immediate results. An analysis of the potential of an FTAA to influence trans-Pacific business
linkages based on these arguments suggests that adoption is far from certain and that northern and
southern countries alike will have to design an agreement with particular attention to social and
economic consequences in Latin American countries.
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1. Introduction 
The Latin American country with the strongest trans-Pacific business 
linkages is neither Peru with its strong historical ties to Japan, nor Mexico with its 
gateway to the United States market, but rather Chile with its well-consolidated 
democratic institutions and strong belief in the rule of law. This counterintuitive 
statistic highlights the important role of political institutions and political 
preferences in the scale, scope, and evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages. 
The relationship between these two variables is not, however, a simple one. The 
choice to open a country to foreign trade and capital flows is influenced by 
political costs and benefits, and the sustainability of that decision rests on the 
political support that liberalizing politicians engender and maintain. I use the 
heterogeneity provided by the Latin American postwar experience to examine the 
political influences on trade policy in general and on the development of trans-
Pacific business linkages in particular. 
While not denying or seeking to minimize the importance of shifts in the 
effective size of the Latin American market or the cost of trade between Latin 
America and NAFTA (Markusen, 2004) that may engender substantial shifts in 
trans-Pacific business linkages and strategies (Frischtak 2004), I seek to craft a 
linkage between the long-term importance of market-supporting institutions for 
economic growth and prosperity (Vial, 2003; Huang, Yeung, and Morck, 2004) 
and the political dynamic unleashed by the FTAA. Without such attention to 
institutional dynamics, the difficult compromises needed to secure the passage of 
the FTAA may be overlooked. Even if these hurdles are overcome and the FTAA 
is enacted, Latin American countries may squander the potential opportunity that 
it generates or, even worse, unleash a negative feedback that could undermine the 
long-term development of market supporting institutions. Huang, Yeung, and 
Morck (2004) provide an historical overview of the liberalization boom in 
ASEAN that they claim has failed to sufficiently develop local institutions in a 
manner that will provide the basis for long-term sustainable domestic growth. 
Particularly in light of the relatively poor perceptions of Latin American 
institutions (Vial, 2003) and the heightened attention paid to such dimensions in 
the aftermath of the East Asian crisis, the cautionary tale on the experience of 
ASEAN should highlight the importance of ex ante attention and focus on the 
process of liberalization and its dynamic impact on local institutional 
development. 
I begin such an analysis by briefly reviewing the recent history of Latin 
American economic linkages, which I will subsequently draw upon in the 
examination of specific relationships between political institutions, external 
shocks and pressures, social indicators and the level, growth and sustainability of 
trans-Pacific business linkages. Next, I survey extant research highlighting the 
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importance of political institutions and political preferences for the international 
investment decisions of Asian multinational corporations. This discussion gives 
rise to specific propositions linking the development of political institutions that 
limit the discretion of incumbent policymakers to the depth and sustainability of a 
nation’s external business linkages which are corroborated by the data. Having 
established this association among levels, I then consider the causal mechanisms 
through which political institutions and preferences may generate policies, which 
enhance business linkages such as the FTAA and, the conditions under which 
such policies are robust to backsliding or retrenchment. Once again, preliminary 
exploration of the data is corroborative. Next, I consider potential positive and 
negative feedback mechanisms between liberalizing policies and institutional 
development. Finally, I conclude by considering the likely impact on trans-Pacific 
business linkages of the potential passage of a Free Trade of the Americas 
Agreement. I highlight the countries most likely to benefit at the current time and 
the types of political, economic and social reforms that would enhance these 
potential benefits. I also suggest avenues for future research that could explore 
some of the proposed relationships in more detail. 
2. Background 
Latin American countries have on average become substantially more linked to 
the external environment as demonstrated by Figure 1 which plots the population 
weighted (top panel) and unweighted (bottom panel) average level of trade as a 
percentage of GDP, foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP (both gross 
and net), portfolio investment (both bonds and equity) as a percentage of GDP, 
and foreign aid as a percentage of GDP.1 The definition of such events is 
inherently arbitrary and made more difficult still by the gap between de jure 
announcements of liberalization and de facto occurrences particularly given the 
rise of non-tariff barriers and other non-transparent mechanisms for impeding 
such linkages. As a result, I rely upon these outcome measures of external 
linkages rather than the policies that may or may not give rise to such linkages. 
                                                
1 Throughout the analysis that follows, I draw from broad social science literatures in international 
political economy and international business to develop a richer understanding of the determinants 
of cross-national and intertemporal variation in trans-Pacific business linkages. While the 
supporting evidence is drawn from international samples of investors, trade flows, and 
policymakers, there is good reason to expect that the link between trans-Pacific business linkages 
and political institutions will mirror these broader trends. Notably, the correlation between trans-
Pacific trade flows and overall trade flows exceeds 0.50. I therefore expect that the political 
factors which shape firm decision-making regarding foreign direct investment and the evolution of 
trade flows globally to be similarly operative on corresponding trans-Pacific business linkages. 
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An examination of these aggregate statistics highlights the dramatic 
expansion of external linkages in the 1986-2000 period. By contrast, the increases 
leading up to the Latin American debt crisis were relatively minor particularly 
when considering private capital flows or examined using population weighted 
data. The aggregate political indicators are also characterized by a substantial 
break in trend though the increase in democratization and checks and balances in 
the political system predated the expansion in external linkages by a few years. 
After decreases of a modest scale on an unweighted scale (top panel) and a more 
substantive scale on a population weighted scale (bottom panel), the political 
indicators plotted in Figure 2 demonstrate a marked improvement beginning in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Figure 3, which plots various types of regimes, 
confirms this trend showing a steady and dramatic increase in the number of 
stable democracies starting in 1981. 
Table 1 lists notable expansions and contraction of external linkages and 
changes in political institutions or economic conditions at the national level for 
the twenty one countries in Latin America with a population greater than one 
million where an expansion (contraction) in external linkages is defined as an 
increase (decrease) of more than 5% of GDP and more than 20% of the initial 
level of trade or investment sustained for at least three years. I summarize these 
country narratives in Appendix 1. Next, drawing from literature in international 
political economy, institutional theory, and multinational strategy, I attempt to 
isolate political, economic, and social factors that help explain a country’s level, 
change in and sustainability of trans-Pacific business linkages. 
3. Political Institutions and Multinational Investment2 
To successfully deploy its resources in a new country, a multinational firm must 
identify and contend with numerous differences between the host country market 
and the markets in which it has previously operated (Beamish, 1988, Hymer, 
1976, Martin, Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998, Zaheer, 1995).  Laws and 
regulations surrounding the acquisition of property, licensing of new businesses, 
hiring of workers, importing factors of production, exporting output or capital, 
contracting with suppliers for needed inputs, payment of taxes, government 
licenses and fees, and the means and feasibility of exit all vary widely across 
countries. Even where laws and regulations appear similar, differences in legal 
systems can have important differences in such relevant outcomes as the 
protection afforded to shareholders versus creditors or minority investors (La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998, La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). A recent study that examined regulations of entry in 
                                                
2 The following section draws from Henisz and Delios (2002). 
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seventy five countries found that the official procedures and costs required to start 
a new business varied from as few as two procedures (Canada) taking two days 
(Canada) and 0.4% of average per capita income (New Zealand) to as many as 
twenty procedures (Bolivia) requiring up to 174 days (Mozambique) and 263% of 
average per capita income (Bolivia) (Djankov, Porta, Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). 
The World Bank expanded and updated this study, finding Laos, Haiti and Congo 
(198, 203 and 215 days), and Belarus (1000% of average per capita income) to be 
even more hostile to entrepreneurship (World Bank, 2004). The same study found 
strong negative correlations between these regulatory burdens and per capita 
income levels across countries. 
In addition to the costs of starting a new business, political, and regulatory 
hurdles can impose substantial costs on the day-to-day operations of an overseas 
subsidiary. Where policymakers can act unilaterally or have high certainty that a 
subservient or allied legislature and judicial branch will support their actions, 
future policies are likely to be more volatile in response to either exogenous 
shocks, changes in the identity of policymakers or even changes in the 
preferences of the existing policymakers (Henisz, 2004).  Such changes that are 
the result of direct lobbying by host country competitors or incumbents are of 
particular concern to multinationals.  
Institutional differences between nations magnify difficulties in collecting, 
interpreting and organizing the relevant information necessary to mount a 
successful entry.  Markets that are similar in political structure pose less 
uncertainty, relatively lower costs of entry and, therefore, lower hurdle rates of 
return.  Investors are hence more likely to enter countries where the future policy 
regime is relatively easy to predict (Bennet & Green, 1972, Fine, 2003, 
Gastanaga, Nugent, & Pashamova, 1998, Green & Cunningham, 1975, Huang, 
Morck, & Yeung, 2004, Loree & Guisinger, 1995, Root & Ahmed, 1978, 
Stobaugh, 1969, Vernon, 1977, Vial, 2003, Wei, 2000), however, as shown in 
samples of Japanese multinationals, this tendency may be attenuated for firms 
with relevant experience in the host country (Henisz & Delios, 2001) or other 
politically hazardous markets (Delios & Henisz, 2003b).  
The impact of institutions on entry strategies can extend beyond the choice 
of where to invest to include the design of the subsidiary.  For example, firms that 
perceive hazards emanating from policy uncertainty can take hazard-mitigating 
actions designed to shift the decision calculus of the potential expropriating 
government.  Such a shift should seek to either raise the political and/or economic 
costs (lost revenue, employment, and future investment) to asset or revenue 
expropriation, or lower the benefits (the value of seized assets or revenue stream 
and the nationalist political reaction) from expropriation. 
As an example of a hazard mitigating strategy, a multinational can form a 
partnership with a host country firm. In such a partnership, the host country firm 
4
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would also suffer in the event of an expropriation of a foreign subsidiary’s returns 
or its assets because of the subsidiary's dependence on a continuing relationship 
with its parent firms for its complementary assets. In exchange for ownership in 
the foreign subsidiary, a host country partner provides a valuable service. Host 
country firms tend to use, on average, a greater percentage of domestic inputs. 
Because of superior information regarding the availability of, terms of, and 
procedures for acquiring goods in the domestic market, host country partners rely 
more heavily than the multinational on domestically-sourced labor, intermediate 
products, and trading partners. While a multinational may pay to acquire this form 
of local information, pursuing such a strategy raises production costs relative to 
domestic firms.  
Depending on the size of this cost wedge, a multinational shifts some 
positive quantity of inputs from domestic to international sourcing (Markusen, 
2003). Expropriation of the assets or revenue stream of a joint venture between a 
multinational and a host country partner will therefore result in a greater 
expropriation of assets or revenue streams owned by domestic constituents than 
expropriation of a solely foreign venture. As more domestic constituents are 
implicated in the expropriation, a partnership between a multinational and a host 
country firm is, on average, politically more costly to expropriate for the 
government than a solely foreign venture.3 Gatignon and Anderson (1988), Hill, 
Hwang and Kim (1990), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Oxley (1999), Delios 
& Beamish (1999), Smarzynska (2000), and Henisz (2000) provide empirical 
evidence supporting this link between market entry mode choice and the degree of 
policy uncertainty while Delios and Henisz (2000) demonstrate that this 
relationship is attenuated for Japanese multinational corporations with relevant 
experience.4 
In addition to the choice of entry mode, the type of assets chosen for 
overseas investment may vary across different institutional structures.  Empirical 
work that has adopted a case study approach provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that long-lived and/or politically visible investments such as those in 
infrastructure sectors will be particularly sensitive to a country's institutional 
environment (Bergara Duque, Henisz, & Spiller, 1998, Caballero & Hammour, 
1998, Crain & Oakley, 1995, Dailami & Leipziger, 1998, Daniels & Trebilcock, 
1994, Grandy, 1989, Levy & Spiller, 1994, Levy & Spiller, 1996 , Ramamurti, 
1996, Savedoff & Spiller, 1997, Spiller & Vogelsang, 1996, Williamson, 1976). 
Two recent efforts to extend this logic to panel datasets in telecommunications 
                                                
3  This hypothesis is strongly supported by the only available empirical study (Bradley, (1977)). 
The author finds that expropriation of joint ventures exclusively between foreign multinationals is 
eight times as likely as expropriation of joint ventures that involve local partners. 
4 Henisz (2000) demonstrates  that this relationship is conditional upon the nature of the assets 
under the purview of the overseas subsidiary.  
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(Henisz & Zelner, 2001) and electricity (Henisz & Zelner, 2002) have also found 
strong support for the hypothesis that political institutions that fail to constrain 
arbitrary behavior by political actors dampen the incentive for infrastructure 
providers to deploy capital and, ceteris paribus, yield lower levels of per capita 
infrastructure investment.  
Another relevant dimension of heterogeneity is that between sales offices 
which sell imported or domestically produces manufacturing output in 
competition with local producers and manufacturing plants that sell exclusively or 
primarily to foreign customers. The former are more likely to incite political 
opposition whereas the latter may enjoy strong political support. Multinational 
firms’ entry choices may therefore reflect a calculation not merely on the 
economics or cultural drivers of the timing of opening a local sales office but also 
on the political dimension as shown in a sample of Japanese multinational 
corporations by Delios and Henisz (2003a). 
Unstable policy regimes and culturally dissimilar markets are likely 
associated with performance penalties as well. Carroll and Delacroix (1982) find 
higher mortality rates for newspapers in Argentina and Ireland during periods of 
political unrest. Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) find that the failure rates of 
foreign firms in the financial service sector are higher in more tightly regulated 
and less globally integrated markets. Henisz and Delios (2003) find that in 
countries with greater policy uncertainty, subsidiary mortality for Japanese 
multinationals is higher although this effect is moderated for firms with relevant 
local experience. Casanova (2004) discusses the performance benefits of staying 
within the multinational corporation’s “natural markets.” Li and Guisinger (1991) 
find an analogous relationship between cultural proximity and survival as do 
Barkema, Bell, and Pennings (1996) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1997). 
As political institutions influence such core elements of multinational 
decision-making as the choice of where to invest, how to organize that 
investment, and when to terminate the investment, we expect political institutions 
to similarly influence the development of trans-Pacific business linkages. Well-
developed institutional structures that provide greater checks and balances against 
arbitrary or capricious policymaking should enjoy greater and more robust trans-
Pacific business linkages:  
Proposition 1a (P1a): Countries with stronger checks and balances  
against political discretion will possess stronger trans-Pacific business 
linkages. 
Proposition 1b (H1b): Countries with stronger checks and balances 
against political discretion will possess trans-Pacific business linkages 
that are more robust to change. 
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Taken together the experience of the twenty one Latin American countries 
provides strong corroborative evidence for this pair of propositions. All the 
country-level measures of political institutions aggregated in Figure 2 are 
positively correlated with each of the country-level measures of openness 
aggregated in Figure 1 with correlations between the various political indicators 
and flows of trade and foreign direct investment ranging from 0.13 to 0.27. 
Further empirical analysis controlling for country size, membership in 
intergovernmental organizations, economic performance and the like continue to 
demonstrate a positive association between a country’s external linkages and the 
development of political institutions which provide a credible commitment to 
investors that policies will not be changed in an arbitrary or capricious manner 
(Henisz & Mansfield, 2004). 
4. The Determinants of Sustainable Liberalization vs. Retrenchment 
Understanding the future course of trans-Pacific business linkages requires not 
only an understanding of the medium or long-term effects of political institutions 
already in place but also an understanding of the political discontinuities that 
trigger sudden changes in policy that make a country more or less attractive to 
foreign investors. Academic accounts of liberalizing reforms in Latin America 
(Armijo & Faucher, 2001, Biglaiser & Brown, 2003, Morley, Machado, & 
Pettinato, 1999, Murillo, 2001, Remmer, 1990, Starr, 2002) as well as more 
popular accounts of recent reversions from market oriented trade reforms in 
Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, stress the discontinuous or episodic nature 
of these events. Fritschtak (2004) highlights the importance of three such 
discontinuous regional trade liberalizations (NAFTA, Caricom, and 
MERCOSUR) for multinational investment patterns to date. Huang, Morck, and 
Yeung (2004), by contrast, provide a cautionary tale of the potentially temporary 
benefits of liberalization in ASEAN countries that failed to upgrade their 
domestic institutions. Vial (2003) emphasizes the extensive institutional 
development needed in much of Latin America just to reach the levels of ASEAN. 
Predicting the future course of trans-Pacific business linkages including future 
expansions and contractions therefore requires an assessment of not only the 
political institutions that constrain policymakers from altering current policies but 
also the forces that encourage them to liberalize or retrench and the feedback 
mechanisms between liberalization and institutional upgrading. 
Liberalization. Academics examining the political determinants of trade 
liberalization have examined many different theoretical relationships finding 
generally mixed support for each depending on the sample of countries and years 
chosen for analysis. Does democratization generate pressures for liberalization 
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due to the economic efficiencies that benefit the median voter (Mansfield, Milner, 
& Rosendorff, 2002) or protectionism due to the greater weight attached to 
concentration of costs in temporal, geographic, and interest group dimensions as 
opposed to the more diffuse long-term benefits (Conybeare, 1991, Goldstein & 
Lenway, 1989, Nollen & Quinn, 1994)? Does poor economic and social 
performance trigger calls for protectionism by insecure polities (Magee, Brock, & 
Leslie Young, 1989) or provide the momentum to overcome coalitions blocking 
welfare-enhancing reforms (Alesina & Drazen, 1991, Drazen & Grilli, 1993, 
Fernandez & Rodrik, 1991, Kingdon, 1984, Nelson, 1990, Williamson, 1993)? Do 
a greater number of veto players in the policymaking process provide for a status 
quo bias in policymaking (Cowhey, 1993, Delmas & Terlaak, 2003, Goldstein, 
1988, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989) or for voice for a wider array of interest groups 
(Frye & Mansfield, 2002)? The unsatisfying answer to even this basic set of 
questions linking national political institutions to trade policy is that it depends. 
In order to ascertain the nature of the contingencies linking political 
institutions, economic, and social outcomes and trade policy, I draw upon the 
theoretical framework developed in Henisz and Zelner (2004). That paper 
develops a neo-institutional theory of the policymaking process. As political 
actors face multiple demands for new policies and are severely limited in the time 
that they can focus on the policymaking process, effecting policy change–
particularly in a domain that impacts such a broad constituency as trade policy–
typically requires that interest groups who favor a change in policy, for either self-
interested or ideological reasons, develop a coalition with other interest groups 
who are only marginally affected or unaffected by the policy change. Such 
coalition formation is facilitated by the development of a master frame (Benford 
& Snow, 2000) that situates trade policy as part of a broader bundle of policies 
that must be altered to deal with an economic or social challenge. The resulting 
pressures for policy change are, however, mediated by country-level institutional 
structures that govern the policymaking process. Where these institutions create 
multiple checks and balances they create a status quo bias that requires a greater 
level of pressure to realize a given policy change. 
Consider for example the decision to liberalize an economy that is 
relatively closed. Given the economic inefficiencies associated with 
protectionism, the existence of such a status quo policy indicates the existence of 
a strong political coalition that benefits from protectionism through ownership of 
import substituting industries or import licenses. Breaking that political coalition 
likely requires a change in political regime that involves a substantive change in 
the identity of the interest groups influencing economic policy such as occurs in 
the aftermath of a change in political regime or political leadership. Within an 
existing regime, such a change in policy could still result due to strong internal or 
external pressure for a policy change that overwhelms the blocking coalition. For 
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example, an economic crisis with steep social costs raises the costs of inaction 
making any policy change regardless of its short-term costs relatively more 
attractive (Alesina & Drazen, 1991, Drazen & Grilli, 1993, Fernandez & Rodrik, 
1991, Nelson, 1990, Williamson, 1993). A crisis may serve as a “focusing event” 
(Kingdon, 1984: 106) that moves reform to the top of the policymaking agenda 
(Hoffman, 1999, Seo & Creed, 2002) by increasing the short-run costs of inaction. 
Only in this circumstance is radical reform such as a shift to market-oriented 
policies likely to occur (Astley, 1985, Jones, Baumgartner, & True, 1998, 
Romanelli & Tushman, 1994). Empirical support for this relationship can be 
found in studies of how poorly mediated distributional conflict precipitated 
monetarist revolutions in Chile and Britain (Fourcade-Courinchas & Babb, 2002), 
broad macroeconomic crises led to the adoption of market-oriented reform 
adoption in Latin America (Armijo & Faucher, 2001, Lora, 2000, Remmer, 1998), 
and the adoption of capital account liberalization (Brune & Guisinger, 2003), or 
privatization programs globally (Banerjee & Munger, 2002). 
Alternatively, the example provided by liberalizing neighbor or the 
external pressure provided by conditional financing from multilateral institutions 
could provide the sort of reference point needed to overcome domestic opposition 
(Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986, Manuel Pastor, 1993). Prior empirical 
studies emphasizing policy emulation include Collier and Messick’s (1975) study 
of the adoption of social security systems, Knoke’s (1982) analysis of the 
adoption of municipal reform in the 267 largest US cities, Kobrin’s (1985) study 
of oil nationalization, Weyland’s (2003) study of the diffusion of pension 
privatization, Guler et al.´s (2002) study of the adoption of quality certification, 
Brune and Guisinger’s (2003) study of capital account liberalization, and Yerba’s 
(2002, 2003) studies of the diffusion of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies. 
Another channel for international pressure to influence domestic 
policymaking is through the interactions between multilateral development 
agencies or private international lenders and their clients. Several unpublished 
empirical studies have found evidence of the coercive influence of multilateral 
development agencies on the likelihood of capital account liberalization (Brune & 
Guisinger, 2003), the adoption of Central Bank Independence (McNamara & 
Castro, 2003), and the promulgation of national right to information or 
transparency laws (Roberts, 2003). The notion of dependency upon international 
capital markets as a driver of domestic reforms has a similarly long intellectual 
lineage (Hirschman, 1958, Hirschman, 1968, Prebisch, 1950, Wallerstein, 1974). 
Proposition 2: Liberalization of trans-Pacific business linkages is more 
likely in relatively closed economies 
(P2a) after a regime change that enfranchises new interest groups 
(P2b) after an economic crisis 
9
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(P2c) in response to external pressure provided by 
the liberalization of trading partners 
the conditionality of external funding 
the dependence on international financial markets. 
Returning to the context of Latin America, expansions and contractions in 
external linkages are closely related to change in political regime (P2a). Of the 
seventy episodes observed (thirty eight liberalizations and thirty two 
retrenchments), twenty nine were shortly preceded by a change in political 
regime. Interestingly, while the dominant correlation was for democratization to 
be associated with liberalization (fourteen cases) and retrenchment to be 
associated with increasing autocracy (five cases), there also existed six cases in 
which democratization was associated with retrenchment and four cases in which 
increased autocracy was associated with liberalization suggesting that changes in 
the composition of interest groups represented in power are crucial rather than the 
nature of the political regime. The tendency for a positive association between 
democratization and liberalization does, however, support the claim that, on 
average, democracies have a broader selectorate (Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & 
Smith, 1999).5 These twenty nine regime changes constituted almost half of the 
49 shifts in political regime observed in the 1960-2000 period in Latin America. 
Turning next to the role of economic crises (P2b), fifty two of the seventy 
episodes were associated with a drop in real per capita incomes or an inflationary 
spike or surge in unemployment. Forty nine of 126 observed recessions; twenty 
six of the sixty eight observed instances of inflation increasing above then 
retreating below 15%; and fifteen of the twenty eight observed spiked in 
unemployment were associated with a shift in trade policy. There was no clear 
association between the incidence of crisis and the direction of change in external 
linkages (twenty three of the thirty two retrenchments or 72% were associated 
with a macroeconomic crisis as compared to thirty of the thirty eight 
liberalizations 79%). This finding demonstrates that it is not a question of whether 
poor macroeconomic performance triggers retrenchment or reform but rather than 
both arguments have at least some validity. Of some concern at present is the 
combination of poor economic and social performance and the fact that in 
nineteen of the twenty-one countries examined the last shift in trade policy was in 
the direction of liberalization. 
In contrast to the corroborative evidence linking external linkages to 
political institutions, external shocks, external pressure in the form of trade 
liberalizations by prominent trading partners, lending from multilateral agencies, 
aid, or dependence on international financial markets due to high debt service 
                                                
5 Thanks to Ed Mansfield for highlighting this potential explanation. 
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obligations appeared to play a role in influencing trade policy regimes only in the 
smaller countries if at all (P2c). The lack of a relationship using simple 
correlations may, however, fail to capture the conditionality of the underlying 
relationship for which other authors have found strong empirical support 
(Biglaiser & Brown, 2003). 
Sustainability. A second question involves the political determinants of 
the sustainability of an adopted liberalization. Here we are considering those 
countries that have already liberalized and the likely political support for 
maintaining that policy of openness. Liberalizing involves numerous short-term 
costs of adjustment including reallocation of physical and human capital into 
those industries in which the country has a comparative advantage at world 
market prices. These short-term costs are tangible and immediate whereas the 
long-term gains of lower consumer prices seem abstract and distant. Despite the 
presence of some interest groups with clear interests in sustained liberalization 
(Rodrik, 1994) and the difficulty in unbundling trade liberalization from a broader 
package of economic reforms (Martinelli & Tommasi, 1997, Tollison & Willett, 
1979), most interest groups and voters are likely to weigh their support for trade 
liberalization not on the balance of long-term gains against short-term costs but 
rather on the immediately observable gains against the short-term costs. Where 
these costs have faded into memory or are swamped by concurrent short-term 
gains, liberalizations are more likely to persist. 
Proposition 3: The sustainability or extension of trans-Pacific business 
linkages  is more likely  
(P3a) with the passage of time  
(P3b) when economic and social welfare indicators demonstrate 
clear progress. 
Comparing medium-term economic and social progress across Latin 
American countries is extremely difficulty due to a lack of historical comparable 
data, a general global upward trend in living standards, and exogenous shocks 
which differentially impact countries based on their natural resource endowments, 
trade patterns or the like. Rather than try to set some arbitrary threshold for 
satisfactory economic and social performance and segment countries into years in 
which liberalization was maintained versus reversed, I note the strong positive 
association between more readily observable crises and policy reversals described 
above and highlight that the dual of this finding is that in the absence of crises, the 
direction of trade policy is more likely to be maintained. 
Positive Feedback Loops. This political decision calculus also gives rise 
to two potential feedback loops: one positive and reinforcing, the other negative 
and perverse. One possibility is that the government takes the additional resources 
11
Henisz: The Political Economy of Trans-Pacific Business Linkages
Brought to you by | University of Pennsylvania
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/7/16 4:18 PM
provided by trade liberalization either directly or indirectly (due to enhanced 
willingness to invest or lend by foreigners) and invests in public goods such as 
education, health care, law and order, and infrastructure. These investments lead 
to a positive association between liberalization and social welfare that enhances 
popular support for the reforms over time. Such investments in public goods have 
almost universal legitimacy across countries. Crafting an association between the 
much more controversial policy of liberalization and progress in these social 
indicators enhances the legitimacy of the policy reform and, thereby, its 
sustainability. Eventually, the reforms shift from being evaluated on the basis of 
their outcomes (Suchman, 1995) to being taken-for-granted or broadly accepted. 
This process of institutionalization creates a cognitive basis for legitimacy that 
further enhances the status quo bias in policymaking (Suchman, 1995, Zucker, 
1987). 
Proposition 4 (P4) When social and economic welfare improve, trans-
Pacific business linkages may reinforce the development of political 
institutions. 
The evidence regarding potential positive feedback effects from trade 
liberalization to political institutions like that of positive economic and social 
performance is less than conclusive. One could posit such an effect in Chile where 
post-1981 liberalization was accompanied by progress in social welfare indicators 
and real per capita income and democratization has clearly been consolidated. The 
simultaneous expansion of economic linkages, political rights, and social welfare 
in Mexico likely enjoyed positive synergies as well. El Salvador is another 
candidate for positive feedbacks as post-1990 liberalization has occurred 
alongside an acceleration of progress in social and economic welfare and the 
consolidation of democracy. 
Negative Feedback Loops. The second possibility is that the government 
squanders, pilfers, or narrowly distributes the direct or indirect gains provided by 
liberalization. While the squandering or pilfering of resources can clearly be 
deemed bad policy, it may appear economically efficient to effect a more narrow 
distribution of resources than the polity would desire to maximize the long-term 
benefits for the country (Forbes, 2000). Such a distribution could, however, be 
perceived as illegitimate by the broad set of interest groups whose support is 
necessary to maintain the existing level of liberalization or expand it further. A 
compromise between economic efficiency and political support is therefore 
implicated. This compromise will tilt more towards political support in the 
absence of checks and balances that provide a status quo bias in policymaking 
particularly in democratic governments where popular interest group support is 
more directly related to short-term political survival. 
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Proposition 5 (P5) When social or economic welfare fail to increase, the 
risk of a reversion in trans-Pacific business linkages is greatest in 
countries with few checks and balances.  
Of some succor in this regard is the dramatic increase in the level of 
checks and balances among Latin American countries over the past two decades. 
These political institutions that inhibit rapid changes in policies may have reduced 
the incidence of retrenchments in external linkages as compared to earlier periods. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, when many countries had autocratic or poorly developed 
democratic institutions, declines in economic performance or social welfare 
indicators frequently triggered retrenchments in trade policy. More recently, as 
checks and balances have developed and democracies have become more 
consolidated (See Figures 2-3), trade policy orientations have proven more 
resilient to change. After altering its orientation and political regime 4 times in 
1975-91 period, Argentina has continued to liberalize over the past twelve; Brazil 
similarly went through four changes from 1975-89 and none in the past fourteen 
years; Chile altered its policy twice from 1973-83 and then remained constant for 
twenty years; Peru changed orientations four times in two decades and has since 
held a liberalization orientation for fourteen; and similar patterns can be found in 
many other countries where democratic consolidation occurred in the intervening 
period. Recent declines in real per capita incomes and social welfare in a number 
of Latin American countries do, however, question the limits on this relationship. 
In thirteen of the twenty one countries, real per capita incomes remain 
below levels attained in the 1970s or 1980s. In the majority of countries, social 
welfare improvements are also falling short of expectations. In Bolivia, Brazil, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela social progress has been 
limited while Argentina, Haiti, and Jamaica social and economic indicators are in 
decline presenting challenges to the democratic regimes in these countries. The 
broad based perception of stagnation or even decline in economic and social 
welfare has led to the rise to office or, at least prominence, of populist leaders in a 
number of countries. So far, however, with the exception of President Chavez in 
Venezuela, these leaders are working within rather than against the political 
system built by their predecessors. While one could surmise that the success of 
these leaders’ efforts to maintain an outward orientation while simultaneously 
providing for the pent up demands of their populations could have implications 
for the future of the political institutions in these countries, such hypotheses 
remain largely speculative at present. 
5. Lessons for the Likely Incidence and Impact of the FTAA 
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The propositions discussed above of the relationships between external linkages, 
political institutions, economic, and social performance suggest that a Free Trade 
of the Americas Agreement neither enjoys a high probability of passage nor, 
should it overcome that hurdle, will it serve as a panacea for Latin American 
countries or their trans-Pacific business networks. With respect to the first pair of 
propositions, the lack of institutional development in Latin America (Vial, 2004) 
particularly in light of investor sensitivity to institutional capacity provides a 
partial explanation for the relatively low current levels of trans-Pacific business 
linkages and suggests that recent gains are not necessarily sustainable. 
Building upon these initial insights, Propositions 2a, 2b and 2c highlight 
the uncertain adoption of the FTAA by Latin American countries. Coordinating 
passage of such extensive legislation through three countries was difficult enough 
in the case of NAFTA but expanding that number to over two dozen could prove 
intractable. Countries that vary so much in terms of their initial level of openness, 
their political and economic cycles and exposure to external pressure from peer 
countries, multilateral lenders, and international financial markets will be hard 
pressed to agree to a set of terms for the FTAA. Perhaps the economic gains are 
substantial enough to obviate the need for these exceptional triggers. The 
experience of the European Union highlights the potential for accord even among 
dozens of countries with similarly disparate conditions. The fact that the European 
Union began as an assembly of six much more homogeneous countries 
responding to clear positive external pressure to avoid a third Franco-German war 
and expanded in response to the rise of Japan as an external economic threat, 
however, highlights the limits to this analogy. 
Consideration of Proposition 3 extends the skepticism by noting the likely 
difficulty in sustaining liberalization should the FTAA overcome the hurdle of 
adoption. The majority of Latin American countries are mired in an extended 
period of slow progress in or even degradation of economic and social 
performance indicators despite embarking upon expansions in external linkages 
that impose substantial short-term economic and political costs. One could be 
tempted to interpret the patterns as offering promise for long-term benefits just 
around the corner. Chile, the earliest liberalizer, has clearly consolidated its 
political reforms as well as making dramatic progress in real per capita income 
and social welfare indicators. A deeper inspection of the timing of the expansion 
of external linkages relative to economic and social gains in Chile provides a 
more cautious or even pessimistic appraisal of short- to medium-term trends for 
the region. Chile liberalized and improved per capita incomes and social welfare 
simultaneously thus building political support for further reforms and 
liberalization. Most countries liberalized five to ten years in the past and have yet 
to show sustained economic and social progress of the sort recorded in Chile 
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beginning after the taming of hyperinflation in 1976-77 and continuing with a 
brief albeit sharp interruption in 1983-84 for more than two decades. 
The clear linkages identified between downturns or stagnation in 
economic and social performance indicators and reversions in external linkages 
give rise to substantial concern for the short- to medium-term policy regime. 
Negative (Proposition 5) rather than positive (Proposition 4) feedback loops 
appear more likely. The current wave of newly elected populist leaders in the 
region faces crucial pressures to deliver to their increasingly dissatisfied 
electorates. Only 16% of respondents in a recent LatinoBarometro poll were 
“satisfied with free markets.” Given the emergent nature of Latin American 
democratic institutions, it is possible that rather than merely triggering a policy 
reversal, continued shortfalls in economic and social performance could lead to 
regime change. Two-thirds of LatinoBarometro respondents indicated 
dissatisfaction with the results of democracy. 
The potential for a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement if adopted to 
positively influence this dynamic requires responsibility from the governments of 
the Latin American countries and the United States. The potential economic gains 
of such an agreement are clear but the question of their distribution is paramount. 
Will the benefits accrue largely to insiders or to the nation as a whole? Will the 
benefits provided to Latin American countries be sufficiently large in the short-
term to be perceived as fair and equitable? Given the tenuous balance of political, 
social, and economic forces, local governments must limit the potential for 
narrow segments of the population to capture a disproportionate share of these 
benefits.  
With or without an FTAA, Latin American governments should focus on 
developing political and market institutions that can support sustainable economic 
and social development. Absent an FTAA, these governments can still undertake 
these reforms but will have fewer resources to do so. Thus the FTAA, like 
multilateral institutions, international financial institutions and Western 
governments, can provide resources needed to address the growing political and 
social tension in Latin America but it can not itself create the necessary 
innovations to insure a positive feedback loop. Institutional development (e.g. 
developing macro-level political institutions that limit the discretion of 
policymakers, reducing the role of state in production, improving financial market 
supervision and corporate governance) is of first-order concern. 
Conditional on the realization of such institutional development, the 
impact of a potential Free Trade of the Americas Agreement on trans-Pacific 
business linkages will also depend crucially upon the nature of that agreement. 
The United States government should strive to insure a broad distribution of gains 
setting aside its strong bargaining power in these negotiations in recognition that 
while it could extract the lions share of the short-term gains, doing so would 
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likely lead either to the collapse of the negotiations or to the collapse of the 
emergent policy regimes and, potentially, political regimes that have fostered the 
development of openness, civil liberties, and political rights. The long-term 
interest of the United States government includes a prosperous and democratic 
Latin America. Should the United States government focus the distribution of 
short-term economic benefits exclusively on those countries that can provide 
resources of use in the War on Terror, it might well be creating a long-term threat 
close to home.  
Should the FTAA overcome the hurdles of adoption and provide for an 
equitable distribution of gains within and across countries, political and 
institutional reforms may be consolidated and trans-Pacific linkages will likely 
continue to expand along with external linkages overall. An FTAA that fails to 
address these distributional issues, however, stands little chance of passage but 
even in the event of such a passage will likely be followed by a societal backlash 
in Latin countries that undermines much of the political and institutional 
development as well as the external business linkages that have been developed in 
recent years. 
Future research should seek to statistically investigate the determinants of 
liberalizing or retrenching policy events and their sustainability across time. 
Better understanding the specific stimuli for such substantial policy changes and 
their durability would help policymakers and investors identify and prepare for 
crucial opportunities to push through liberalizing policies and hold-off pressures 
for retrenchment, Such analysis might also identify counter-intuitive policies that 
enhance sustainability such as effective education or health care expenditure 
which could subsequently be bundled with trade reform. The preliminary 
evidence gathered here suggests that such research would both inform the debate 
regarding the adoption of the FTAA and prepare managers for the future 
evolution of trans-Pacific business linkages. 
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TABLE 1 : Changes in External Linkages Economic crisis External Pressure
Country Episode Type Year Regime Change? Change in Real Per Capita GDP Inflation Unemployment Trading partner openness Multilateral Lending/GDP Aid/GNP Debt Service/GDP
Argentina
Retrenchment 1963-65 1962: -2.5%; 1963: -6.7%
Liberalization 1975-77 1973 --> Democracy From 32% (1972) to 45% (1974)
Retrenchment 1978-80 1977 --> Autocracy 1975: -1.6%; 1976: - 3.6%; 1978: -5.9% 1975: 182%; 1976: 444%
Liberalization 1985-89 1983 --> Democracy 1981: -7.1%; 1982: -6.4%; 1985: -9.0% 1981: 104%; 1982: 165%; 1983: 344%; 1984: 627%; 1985: 672% 1980: 2.3%; 1985: 5.3% From 6% (1980) to 31% (198
Retrenchment 1989-91 1988: -3.9%; 1989: -8.8% 1986: 90%; 1987: 131%; 1988: 343%; 1989: 3080% 1986: 4.4%; 1989: 7.3% From 0.1% (1984) to 0.6% From .04% in 1985 to 0.3% iFrom 31% (1985) to 37% (19
Liberalization 1991- 1990: -3.7% 1990: 2314% 1990: 7.3%
Bolivia
Retrenchment 1974-85 1964 --> Autocracy 1968: -14.2%; 1969: 0.6%; 1970: -2.8% 1972: 3.7%; 1973: 31.5%; 1974: 62.8%
Liberalization 1988- 1983 --> Democracy 25% fall in eight consecutive years of decline 1982: 124%; 1983: 276%; 1984: 1281%; 1985: 11750%; 1986: 276%
Brazil
Liberalization 1967-74 1964 --> Autocracy Stagnant for four years
Retrenchment 1974-78
Liberalization 1978-80 1978: 0.81% after averaging >6% 1968-76 From 25% (1964) to 49% (1977)
Retrenchment 1984-89 1984 --> Democracy 1981: -6.5%; 1982: -1.6%; 1983: -5.4% 1981: 101%; 1982: 101%; 1983: 135% 1980: 2.8%: 1983: 4.9% From 0.2% (1981) to 0.6% (1984)
Liberalization 1989- 1988: -1.9% 1986: 147%; 1987: 228%; 1988: 629%; 1989: 1430%; 1999: 2948% 1984: 2.4%; 1992: 6.5%
Chile
Liberalization 1973-75 1973 --> Autocracy 1972: -2.5%; 1973: -6.5% 1971: 20.0%; 1972: 74.8%; 1973: 362%
Retrenchment 1975-82 1975: -12.8% 1974: 505%; 1975: 375%
Liberalization 1983- 1981 --> Constitution 1982: -11.7%; 1983: -5.3% 1980: 10.4%; 1982: 19.6%
Colombia
Liberalization 1965- 1963: -0.2% 1963: 32%
Costa Rica
Retrenchment 1974-76 1973: 15%; 1974: 30%
Liberalization 1976-81 1975: -0.5%
Retrenchment 1982-86 1980: -2.2%; 1981: -5.1%; 1982: -9.9% 1981: 37%; 1982: 90% 1980: 5.9%; 1982: 9.4%
Liberalization 1986- 1985: -2.2% 1984: 5.0%; 1985: 6.8% From 1% (1983) to 3% (198From 1.4% (1980) to 7.7% (1From 24% (1980) to 57% (19
Dominican Republic
Liberalization 1965-74 1965 --> Autocracy 1964: -15.2% From 2.2% (1964) to 8.9% (1965)
Retrenchment 1974-83
Liberalization 1983- 1978 --> Democracy 1981: -1.0%; 1983: -2.1% 1983: 20%; 1984: 45% From 6.3% (1974) to 31% (1
Ecuador
Liberalization 1970-74 1969-72 --> Autocracy 1969: -0.7%
Retrenchment 1974-81 1974: 23.3%
Liberalization 1981- 1979 --> Democracy From 10% (1975) to 72% (1982)
El Salvador
Liberalization 1969-77 1964-67 --> Democracy From 26% (1963) to 34% (1968)
Retrenchment 1979-89 1977-79 --> Autocracy 1978: -6.0%; 1979: -13.1%
Liberalization 1989- 1984 --> Democracy <1% cumulative growth 1982-88 Averaged > 20% per annum 1984-89 From 29% (1986) to 37% (1989) From 1.7% (1979) to 11% (1987)
Guatemala
Liberalization 1962-77
Retrenchment 1977-85 1969-82 --> Autocracy
Liberalization 1985- 1983-86 --> Democracy 19% cumulative drop 1979-85 From 0.3% (1983) to 1.1% (1985) From 5% (1980) to 17% (198
Haiti
Retrenchment 1962-67 1958 --> F. Duvalier
Liberalization 1973-80 1972 --> J.C. Duvalier negative cumulative growth over 10 years
Retrenchment 1980-92 1980: -4.4% after > 20% cumulative increase in 5 years
Liberalization 1994- 1994 --> Democracy > 40% cumulative decline since 1979 1993: 39% From 4% (1992) to 32% (1994)
Honduras
Liberalization ??-1980
Retrenchment 1980-87 1980 --> Democracy 1979: -2.7%; 1980: -0.7% 1979: 19%
Liberalization 1987- 1985: -2.4%
Jamaica
Retrenchment 1975-77 20% cumulative decline 1971-75 1973: 27%
Liberalization 1977- Additional 4% decline 1976-77 1977: 34%
Mexico
Liberalization 1975-
Nicaragua
Liberalization 1961-65 1962 --> Democracy
Liberalization 1971-74 1970 --> Autocracy 3% cumulative fall 1969-71
Retrenchment 1979-87 1979 --> Democracy 1977: -10.6%; 1978: -28.7% 1978: 48%
Liberalization 1987- 1988 --> End of State of 29% cumulative fall 1984-87 1984: 219%; 1985: 681%; 1986: 911%; 1987: 10205% 1982: 3.4%; 1987: 6.0%
Panama
Retrenchment ??-1989
Liberalization 1989-97 1989 --> Democracy 1986: -3.8%; 1987: -15.1%; 1988: -0.5% 1985: 10.5%; 1989: 16.3%
Paraguay
Retrenchment 1961-63 1961: -1.1%
Liberalization 1976-80 From 27% (1972) to 40% (1976)
Retrenchment 1980-83
Liberalization 1983- 1981: -6.5%; 1982: -5.8% 1981: 5.6%; 1982: 8.3%
Peru
Retrenchment 1961-65
Retrenchment 1968-71 1968 --> Autocracy 1967: -2.4% 1967: 19%
Liberalization 1976-80 1977 --> Democracy 1975: -0.8%; 1976: -2.3%; 1977: -2.4%
Retrenchment 1980-87
Liberalization 1989- 1987: -10.5%; 1988: -10.8% 1987: 667%; 1988: 3399%; 1989: 7482% 1986: 4.8; 1988: 7.9%
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Trinidad & Tobago
Retrenchment 1965-67 1966 --> Democracy 1964: -0.5% From 0.1% (1962) to 2.3% (1965)
Retrenchment 1980-85 1980: 17.5%
Liberalization 1987-97 Cumulative 18% drop 1983-87 1981: 10%; 1987: 22.3%
Uruguay
Retrenchment 1960-64
Liberalization 1973-77 1971-74 --> Autocracy 1970: -0.6%; 1971: -1.3% 1971: 76%; 1972: 97%
Retrenchment 1977-82 1977: 0.9%
Retrenchment 1983-88 1981: -10.3%; 1982: -10.8%; 1983: -1.8%
Venezuela
Liberalization 1972-74 1970: -1.9%; 1971: -2.1%
Retrenchment 1974-83 1973: -1.4%; 1974: -0.7%
Liberalization 1983-90 25% cumulative drop 1976-84 1981: 7%; 1983: 13%
Retrenchment 1990-95 1988: -11.0% 1988: 84% 1987: 7.3%; 1989: 10.4%
Retrenchment 1997- 1997: -1.8%; 1998: -7.9% 1995: 100% 1992: 6.7%; 1998: 14.9%
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Figure 2: Political Institutions 
Population Weighted Political Indicators
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Figure 3: Count of Regimes 
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Appendix 1: Country Narratives 
• Argentina. Argentina experienced its first retrenchment after the recession of 
1962-63. Then followed a decade of relative stability in external linkages 
under the military governments of 1966-73 during which time real per capita 
incomes soared 60%. Subsequently, Argentina experienced fitful 
liberalizations episodes under the brief democratic regime of the Perons from 
1973-1976 and after the return of democracy under Raul Alfonsin in 1983 that 
each ended in hyperinflation and contributed to a steady decline in real per 
capita income. Despite the more than 25% reduction in real per capita income, 
there was no substantive reduction in external linkages perhaps due to the 
numerous checks and balances that characterized the relatively stable 
Argentine political regime. After inflation peaked over 3000% in 1989, the 
new Argentine government of Carlos Menem launched a more sustainable 
economic reform program that simultaneously tackled inflation and 
committed the economy to openness particularly with its partners in 
MERCOSUR. Within a decade, real per capita income had increased by over 
one third.  
• Bolivia. Political instability and regime change in the 1968-71 period ended in 
hyperinflation and the reversion of prior progress in the establishment of 
external linkages. After the taming of hyperinflation in the late 1980s, external 
linkages again began a steady upward trend. During the next twelve-year 
period, real per capita income increased by over 20% but remained more than 
10% below their 1979 peak and 5% below the previous peak of 1968. The 
onset of a relatively mild recession in 1999 triggered a partial reversion in 
external linkages despite the development of strong checks and balances 
within the policymaking structure perhaps because economic and social 
progress had been relatively moderate under the democratic regime. 
• Brazil. Beginning shortly after the consolidation of autocracy in Brazil in 
1965, a near decade period of steady growth and increased external linkages 
contributed to a more than doubling of real per capita income. As growth 
slowed in the mid-1970s, external linkages were reduced and entered a period 
of volatility. The sharp recession of 1981-83 culminated in a regime change 
and the onset of democratization in 1984 under Jose Sarney. Brazil then began 
an expansionist policy that briefly improved economic performance but 
ultimately culminated in hyperinflation and a two decade low in external 
linkages in 1989. Another expansionist though less severe cycle characterized 
the leadership of the National Reconstruction leaderships of Presidents 
Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco and ended in 1994-95 with the election of 
Fernando Cardoso of the Brazilian Social Democratic Party at which time a 
sustained period of growth in incomes and external linkages under low 
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inflation began. External linkages did not revert during the 1998-99 recession 
perhaps aided by the strong checks and balances in the new Brazilian political 
system and a honeymoon effect that remained from the slaying of inflation. 
The steep rise of unemployment and increase in male and female mortality 
rates, however, called into question the sustainability of these policies in the 
medium term. 
• Chile. Chile underwent a regime change in 1973 replacing the democratically 
elected President Allende with the military junta of General Pinochet. After a 
rapid liberalization of the economy including an expansion of external 
linkages, a hyperinflationary episode followed which triggered a collapse in 
real per capita income growth as well as a pause in the growth of external 
linkages. Rapid growth in external linkages resumed after the passage of the 
1981 constitution, which called for a return to democracy and survived the 
steep 1983-84 recession. Per capita income grew at steady and sustainable 
rates since 1985 leading real per capita income to more than double in twenty 
years. Since the inception of democracy, external trade linkages have trended 
slightly downward through capital linkages have soared. 
• Colombia. Colombia exhibits relatively steady democratic institutions, per 
capita income growth and moderate inflation throughout the 1960-98 period 
and steady growth in trade linkages after 1965. Liberalization survived the 
mild 1976 and 1983 recessions as well as the more severe 1998-99 recession 
perhaps due to the well-developed political institutions that provided a status 
quo bias for trade policy.  
• Costa Rica. While the Costa Rican democracy remains among the strongest in 
Latin America, the inflationary episodes of 1973-74 and 1979-82 both 
triggered recessions and substantive pauses in otherwise uninterrupted growth 
of external linkages and per capita income levels. 
• Dominican Republic. External linkages rose substantially over the 1965-74 
period under the Presidency of Juan Balaguer who emerged from a military 
triumvirate that assumed power after the brief Presidency of Juan Bosch of the 
Revolutionary Party. This progress was largely reversed in 1975-83 as the rate 
of economic growth and progress in social indicators slowed. The 
consolidation of democracy and return of Juan Balaguer to power in 1987 led 
to another burst of growth in external linkages that survived the steep 1989-90 
recession that tamed inflation and continued through 2000 and led to a 50% 
increase in real per capita incomes over that period. Of some concern, 
however, is the dramatic slowdown in the rate of improvement of social 
welfare indicators under the democratic regime. 
• Ecuador. The end of a brief experiment with democracy in the late 1960s led 
to a surge in external linkages followed by a collapse that expanded again 
after Ecuador’s transition to democracy in 1979. Real per capita income levels 
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doubled during this period but stagnated under democratic rule as moderate 
inflation began to escalate. External linkages have trended slowly upwards 
without a significant reversion since the consolidation of the democratic 
regime but have not yet regained their 1975 peak. 
• El Salvador. External linkages, per capita income levels and inflation all 
expanded together in the 1970s under the expansionist policies of the National 
Conciliation Party. The growth collapse associated with domestic unrest that 
escalated into civil war over the late 1970s and early 1980s triggered a 
collapse in external linkages and culminated in the return of democracy in 
1984. The nascent democracy undertook an expansionist policy leading to a 
moderate spike in inflation, which peaked in 1985. By the late 1980s and 
more clearly in the early 1990s, per capita income growth began to accelerate, 
inflation was attenuated and external linkages began to return towards their 
peak of the late 1970s. 
• Guatemala. External linkages and real per capita income grew in tandem 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s even as democracy was undermined, human 
rights abuses expanded and power grew increasingly concentrated in the 
hands of a series of right-wing governments. The positive economic trends 
were broken at the onset of the Latin American debt crisis. The subsequent 
recession coincided with a regime change in 1986 and the new democratically 
elected government reemphasized external linkages and the country returned 
to a relatively stable period of growth in per capita income. External linkages 
grew throughout the period with noteable accelerations in 1986-90 and 1996-
2000. 
• Haiti. After an extended experiment with increasing autarky under Francois 
Duvalier, the Haitian government expanded external linkages from 1973 
through the early 1980s under his son Jean-Claude Duvalier. Real per capita 
income levels climbed over 20% but in 1981 a reversion began that 
accelerated as the society crumbled (both male and female mortality rates 
increased steadily over the next twenty years and real per capita income fell 
by more than a third). The onset of regime change and eventual 
democratization in 1995 led to some shift in favor of external linkages and a 
halting of the decline in real per capita income but also an acceleration in the 
degradation of social indicators. 
• Honduras. After over two decades of steadily increasing external linkages and 
real per capita incomes, Honduras began a regime change towards democracy 
in 1981 that led to a shift in policy and a decrease in external linkages though 
notable improvement occurred in social indicators. In 1986, after a two-year 
return to military rule, Liberal President Jose Simeon initiated an increase in 
external linkages but also the first of a series of expansionist policies that led 
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to an acceleration of inflation and no growth in real per capita income or 
social indicators.  
• Jamaica. Jamaica does not present a clear relationship between political 
variables, economic performance and external linkages. External linkages 
were relatively stable during the 1960-1972 period when per capita incomes 
doubled and social indicators were improving dramatically. A reversion 
occurred during the post 1973 recession under the first administration of the 
People’s National Party and Prime Minister Michael Manley but external 
linkages began to expand again in 1977 and continued to expand through a 
period of increasingly expansionist cycles initiated by Manley and his 
successors from both parties that saw inflation climb and real per capita 
incomes fall back to their 1960 levels. In the late 1980s and 1990s, foreign 
direct investment began to flow in and real per capita incomes made up one-
half of their previous fall though they began to fall again after inflation was 
brought under control in the mid-1990s, the improvement in social indicators 
plateaued and political instability began to rise. 
• Mexico. Mexico has exhibited a steady increase in external linkages, 
democratization of political institutions and improvement in social indicators 
over the 1975-2000 period. Real per capita incomes improved by 150% from 
1960-80 then stagnated for over a decade after the Latin American debt crisis 
as inflation soared. Since the control of inflation and the passage of NAFTA 
in 1995, the expansion of external linkages has accelerated and real per capita 
incomes have resumed their upward trend increasing by over 25% in only five 
years. 
• Nicaragua. External linkages were on a gradual upward trend in the 1960s 
and 1970s until the victory of the Sandinista movement and associated 
escalation of the civil war including American military intervention of the 
early 1980s triggered an economic depression. The state of emergency was 
lifted in 1988 and external linkages began to expand. They subsequently 
paused their growth as expansionist policies led to both hyperinflation and 
soaring unemployment. With the control of inflation and the consolidation of 
democracy in the early 1990s under Prime Minister Violeta Chamorro, 
external linkages soared and real per capita incomes began to climb though 
improvement in social indicators plateaued. 
• Panama. Only partial data on external linkages is available for Panama prior 
to 1980 at which time such flows were contracting precipitously, real per 
capital income was falling and unemployment was soaring. Beginning with 
the US imposed regime change in 1990, external linkages recovered rapidly as 
did per capita incomes.  
• Paraguay. External linkages were relatively stable during the Paraguayan 
boom of 1960-80 when real per capita incomes almost doubled. They trended 
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downwards in the late 1970s and early 1980s along with real per capita 
incomes and then began to rise rapidly particularly after the 1990 
democratization and subsequent control over inflation. While real per capital 
incomes never reattained their 1980s peak, social indicators showed some 
improvement over this period.  
• Peru. Peru’s external linkages contracted steadily until the consolidation of 
the military regime of Juan Velasco in the early 1970s at which point they 
began an upward trend that lasted until the reinstitution of democracy in 1979 
(itself following the recession of 1976-78) which triggered a steep downward 
trend in real per capita incomes and the acceleration of inflation into 
hyperinflation (almost 7,500% in 1989) until Fujimori’s victory over the 
Shining Path insurgency again reversed the trend. From 1993-97, eternal 
linkages expanded dramatically and real per capita income increased by 
almost one third though they remain below the level attained in the 1970s. 
Despite a recession in 1998-99, external linkages have not declined perhaps 
due to the consolidation of a system of checks and balances in the country’s 
political institutions. 
• Trinidad & Tobago. External linkages contracted dramatically shortly after 
the institution of the first democratically elected Parliament in 1966. External 
linkages thereafter remained on a slight downward trajectory through the 
doubling of real per capita income to 1981 and its 20% reduction to 1987. At 
the nadir of the 1983-89 recession however, the first government of the 
National Alliance for Reconstruction under Prime Minister Arthur Robinson 
reversed this long-standing trend and external linkages began to climb 
upward. While this shift coincided with an increase in real per capita income 
which regained the 1981 peak, social indicators actually deteriorated during 
this economic boom. The trend continued under successor governments of 
both parties and the 1992-93 recession, highlighting the strength of the 
nation’s system of checks and balances. 
• Uruguay. External linkages were volatile but trending downwards as real per 
capita income stagnated from 1960-74. After a regime change in 1974, the 
new autocratic government shifted course and pursued a policy that enhanced 
external linkages. It abruptly shifted course during the growth pause of 1977 
and again during the deep recession of 1982-85. The reintroduction of 
democracy in 1986 saw a return of the gradual downward trend in external 
linkages now with growth in real per capita incomes. 
• Venezuela. External linkages trended gently downwards and per capita income 
gently upwards under the democratic regime from 1960 to 1977 with the 
exception of the surge in the dollar value of linkages provided by the 1973 oil 
shock. The economy began to deteriorate in the late 1970s and experienced 
negative real per capita growth for eight consecutive years. External linkages 
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recovered in the late 1980s and accelerated in the early 1990s though real per 
capita incomes were stagnant or even falling below their levels of 1960 and 
inflation was accelerating. The election of Hugo Chavez in 1998 triggered a 
reversion of external linkages and an acceleration of the deterioration of real 
per capita incomes. 
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